Revolution in Georgia?

December 2024

In the last days of November 2024, longstanding protests against the government in the small Caucasus republic Georgia were reinvigorated and suddenly erupted in new mass demonstrations. These as well as prior protests were all triggered by government actions that are seen as jeopardising Georgia’s strived for accession to the Europan Union (EU) and purportedly steer the country into authoritarianism and Russia’s orbit. As such, the situation is often framed as a valiant struggle of a freedom loving people against an oppressive government that has lost any support bringing the country to the brink of a successful democratic revolution. A closer look by the Swiss Institute for Global Affairs (SIGA) reveals, though, that the situation is more complicated, amongst others as the ruling party has proven to be able to survive such protests in the recent past and apparently enjoys more backing than often suggested.

In the night from 29th to 30th of November 2024 as well as every night since then, longstanding protests against Georgian Dream, the party that has been ruling Georgia since 2012, suddenly swelled again to tens of thousands of participants in the streets of the Georgian capital Tbilisi and, albeit in considerably lower but nonetheless notable numbers, in various other places across Georgia. Before that, demonstrations against Georgian Dream and its declared victory of a majority of almost 54% in regular parliamentary elections held on 26th of October 2024 had, despite widespread allegations of large-scale election fraud, essentially failed. These post-election protests never reached critical turnouts and their mood was subdued and rightly described as at times being reminiscent of a funeral.

What gave the dying protest movement a new breath of life was an announcement of the renewed Georgian Dream government on 28th of November 2024 to suspend efforts to open negotiations on EU accession until 2028. The goal of an EU accession of Georgia is enshrined in the Georgian constitution and since long a corner stone of the foreign policy of the small Caucasus republic, with surveys consistently showing that an overwhelming majority of the Georgian population favours this. Fears that the Georgian Dream government is steering the country away from its course towards the EU have also been the lifeblood of all recent protests. Nevertheless, on the first night after the mentioned announcement, this did not appear to be a game changer. Numbers of protestors rose to several thousands and, in contrast to the protests in the preceding days, the atmosphere was for once again forceful and active; however, it was still a far cry from putting critical pressure on the government.

This only changed in the following nights, arguably because police violence during dispersals of the protests in the early hours of 29th of November 2024 stoked the anger of many more Georgians who suddenly took to the streets and increased the crowd to several tens of thousands, at peak times possibly around 100,000. Following this, Georgian President Salome Zourabishvili, whose role is supposed to be mostly ceremonial but who has become one of the most prolific critics of Georgian Dream, reiterated her backing of demonstrators, stating that the Georgian population had started an irreversible «resistance movement» against the current ruling party and its policies. In addition, Georgian demonstrators also received messages of support from representatives of the EU and various Western countries (see e.g. here, here, here, and here). In view of all this, Georgian protestors and news coverage alike depicted and continue to depict the events as being on the brink of a successful popular revolution.

Given the described situation, it indeed often seems that Georgian Dream, after the party was set to unexpectedly easily survive allegations of a «stolen» election, had become too bold and, with their announcement of the suspensions of efforts for EU accession negotiations until 2028 as well as apparently ordering a violent crackdown on protestors, had gone too far. And that, now that the genie was out of the bottle, protestors are not stopping short of anything but an end of Georgian Dream rule and leaving Georgian Dream little choice than to eventually yield to the pressure of the street.

While this is a potential scenario, it is far from the only likely one. This is all the more the case as the situation has various hallmarks of events from spring 2024 that were, at that time, also often, but in the end wrongly, seen as Georgian Dream having dug its own grave. 

More specifically, after the EU had granted Georgia the status of a candidate country in December 2023, Georgian Dream also appeared to be emboldened and, in April 2024, tabled the law on «Transparency of Foreign Influence». This contentious law, which foresees that Georgian organisations that receive more than 20% of their funding from abroad have to register as «organisations pursuing the interests of a foreign power», is regularly, albeit highly questionably, likened to similar Russian legislation and seen as an attempt to stifle dissent. In any event, and not unlike Georgian Dream’s latest announcement regarding a suspension of efforts to open negotiations on EU accession, the proposal of the controversial law sparked protests that lasted weeks and, at peak times, reached numbers of between 100,000 and 200,000 people on Tbilisi’s streets. It also led to heavy diplomatic pressure from Western countries: the EU de facto halted the process of Georgia’s envisioned EU accession as well as withheld or reallocated at least 121.3 million € of financial support to Georgia; and the United States of America ordered a comprehensive review of its partnership with Georgia that, amongst others, caused the suspension of a planned joint military exercise and at least 95 million U.S.$ of aid as well as the imposition of sanctions against certain Georgian officials.

Also back then, it appeared that Georgian Dream had gone too far and made a misstep that had set things in motion that would cost the party its mandate. However, Georgian Dream remained largely unperturbed, similar to now, having already then displayed the tens of thousands of protestors who, day after day and over weeks, took to the streets of the Georgian capital as a radical minority that paled against the silent majority of the Georgian population that remain in their houses and that Georgian Dream claimed to have behind them. Eventually, and after the Georgian-Dream-dominated parliament pushed through the contentious law, protests abated and then disappeared without Georgian Dream having been forced to make any concessions.

And not only that. A survey that the Caucasus Research Resource Center conducted at the height of the protests in April and May 2024 did not only show that the Georgian-Dream-led government had not lost support, but even enjoyed a higher rate of approval amongst the Georgian population than in previous years. Similarly, while it is hotly contested that Georgian Dream won the claimed clear majority of almost 54% of votes in the election on 26th of October 2024, all available information, including various independent polls from before and after the election, leave no doubt that Georgian Dream remains the by far strongest political force in Georgia; even accounts critical of Georgian Dream suggest that the party enjoys at least 30% to around 40% of popular support which surpasses the results of the second and third placed party even if they were combined. Arguing that this has, due to latest events completely changed is, in view of all this and despite protests against Georgian Dream this time around being more widespread and heated, not only speculative but open to question.

It is also crucial to note that often heard accusations that Georgian Dream and the government it leads is pro-Russian are highly doubtful. In fact, various Western diplomats and other well-placed sources in Georgia agree in private that there is no tangible indication let alone evidence that Georgian Dream is subservient to or subverted by Russia and that there is also no sign of any significant Russian interference in Georgia in general. This is relevant as there are anecdotes that such wrong accusations of Georgian Dream supporters being pro-Russian seem to rather solidify backing for Georgian Dream and their rejection of any opposition forces.

As such, and as the Georgian-Dream-led government tries to project normalcy and has seemingly ordered still continuing heavy-handed police action against protestors to be somewhat more restraint than at the very beginning of renewed mass protests, it is very well possible that Georgian Dream might, just like in spring 2024, weather mass protests by letting them blow over. Or by using the fact that some protestors provoke police action by launching firework at them or the parliament and on various occasions set fires in the streets and in one night even managed to do so inside the parliament building to discredit the mostly peaceful protests as violent. 

That Georgian Dream might well come out on top is also all the more possible as the month following the disputed election has revealed that the block of opposition parties is utterly unable to meaningfully challenge Georgian Dream and to garner critical popular support and as it remains uncertain whether or what viable political alternative to Georgian Dream could emerge from the current reinvigorated, but spontaneous protests that lack any clear leadership.

In view of all this, Georgian Dream’s decision to announce to work on meeting EU criteria on a sovereign basis without financial EU aid and postpone efforts to open EU accession negotiations to 2028 might — independent of whether it is honest or not— not be the rash misstep as which it appears at first sight. In this context, it is also important to note that the controversial announcement from the beginning appeared to be a political manoeuvre to preempt yet another expected negative EU declaration in mid-December 2024 that will likely once again put the blame for Georgia’s stumbling EU accession squarely at the feet of Georgian Dream.

That said, there are some key differences between the current situation and the mass protests in spring 2024 some of which could become game changers.

For one, while protests in spring were mostly confined to the capital Tbilisi, latest events have led to demonstrations in a number of cities and some small towns across Georgia. This lends the current protests much more the character of a broad popular uprising and undermines Georgian Dream displays of the demonstrations as consisting of a radical urban class that has lost touch with the general Georgian population. Some also argue that protestors are now more determined than in spring, as, back then, they had, in the eventually occurred case of failing results of protests, the hope to facilitate change in the elections of 26th of October 2024, while now it is an apparent now-or-never moment.

Arguably even more crucial, current protest have, in contrast to events in spring, received some open support from civil servants. Since Georgian Dreams’ controversial announcement regarding the strived for opening of EU accession negotiations at least a few hundred civil servants from various branches of government have signed open statements expressing criticism and worries about the contentious decision. In some, albeit so far limited cases, civil servants, namely a deputy minister of foreign affairs, a handful of ambassadors, as well as at least one employee of the Ministry of Defence and one of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, went farther and handed in their resignations. If such resignations should increase or civil servants should actively join protests, this might put Georgian Dream in a significantly more difficult situation than numbers of regular protestors growing by additional thousands. Whether or to what extent this will happen remains to be seen though as, at the time of writing, resignations remained exceptions and the referenced open statements are rather vague and have not been meaningfully followed up by the undersigned.

Similar considerations apply to announcements of various trade unions, businesses, and business associations that, sometimes more, sometimes less explicitly express solidarity with protestors and criticism of the controversial government announcement (see e.g. here, here, here, here, and here) — i.e. while such steps have potential to critically tip the scale, they have so far mostly remained vague and not yielded clear results.

Another potential game changer is that the current President of Georgia Salome Zourabishvili has announced that she will, given that she sees the recent parliamentary election due to widespread fraud as illegitimate, refuse to leave her position at the upcoming end of her term on 29th of December 2024. In view of this and as the new Georgian Dream government has already stated that they will insist on Zourabishvili leaving her office, this is set to lead to a standoff that would be difficult for Georgian Dream to handle. More specifically, while ordering police to disperse protestors on the street can be justified by keeping up law and order, forcibly dislodging the president from her office would be much more difficult to defend and entail the risk of leading to even more backlash and a further undermining of the government’s claim to be in legitimate control. To some extent, this scenario is, however, dependent on mass protests continuing to and beyond the end of the year or being quickly resumed in late December 2024 / early January 2025 when Georgian Dream might actually move against Zourabishvili, which is — especially as cold weather and the upcoming holiday season will likely take a toll on the endurance of protestors — far from certain.

In view of all the above and barring some major unforeseen escalation, the regularly conveyed portrayal of Georgia being at the cusp of a popular revolution and Georgian Dream having lost all credibility is far less clear than most coverage suggests.

Franz J. Marty