The Geopolitical Implications of Georgia’s Parliamentary Election

October 2024

On 26th of October 2024, citizens of the small Caucasus republic Georgia are heading to the ballot boxes to elect a new parliament. While this is nominally a regular national election, most people in- and outside of Georgia, including institutions such as the European Council and Russia’s foreign intelligence service, see it not only as a pivotal moment for Georgia, but an event with larger geopolitical implications. In some aspects, for example regarding the question of Georgia’s efforts to become a member of the European Union (EU) as well as Western involvement in Georgia, this is true. Other geopolitical issues, like claims of Russian subversion and Georgia being a battlefield in the global contest between liberal democracies and authoritarian systems are, however, less clear than regularly displayed.

A Georgian casting a vote in a mock election conducted to introduce and test new voting systems (12th of September 2024) (source: Central Election Commission of Georgia)

That Georgian voters will elect a new parliament in late October 2024 is since long clear, as it is a regular election at the end of the four year term of the current Georgian parliament. Under ordinary circumstances, such an election in a small country with only a little over 3.5 million registered voters that seldom manages to break into international headlines would arguably barely be taken note of outside of Georgia. But circumstances are not ordinary as external as well as Georgian actors see the election not only as decisive moment for Georgia but also as having various geopolitical implications. Accordingly, the upcoming Georgian parliamentary election has received and continues to receive high-profile attention well beyond Georgia.

Most notably, representatives from various Western countries and the European Union (EU) have, in the run-up to the Georgian parliamentary election, issued a myriad of statements deploring a dramatic democratic backsliding in Georgia. These reactions have, explicitly or implicitly, been framed in the larger geopolitical context of Georgia’s EU candidacy, the West’s standoff with Russia, and a global contest between liberal democracies and authoritarian systems.[1]

All these statements were caused by various controversial actions of the Georgian government that are seen as jeopardising Georgia’s constitutionally declared goal of a Euro-Atlantic integration, in practice first and foremost the strived for EU accession. Regularly, the most prominently mentioned concrete trigger is the adoption of a Georgian law on «Transparency of Foreign Influence» on 3rd of June 2024 despite mass protests against this law in Georgia. The contentious law requires foreign-funded Georgian organisations to register as «organisations pursuing the interest of a foreign power», is feared to lead to suppression of civil society and independent media, and is likened to similar Russian legislation. Other criticised actions of the Georgian government include, but are not limited to, recent repeated statements of Georgian Dream, the party that has been ruling Georgia since 2012, to ban practically all Georgian opposition parties in case of an election victory; Georgian Dream rhetoric about a purported conspiracy of a shadowy undefined Western Global War Party that wants to drag Georgia into a war against Russia[2]; as well as the adoption of a law on «Family Values and the Protection of Minors» directed against alleged LGBTQ propaganda. These actions of the Georgian government stand, according to all these Western statements, in conflict with the will of an overwhelming majority of Georgians to join the EU. The latter is a reference to various surveys indicating that between 71% and 86% of Georgians are in favour of their country becoming an EU member. Accordingly, the mentioned statements underscored the importance of the upcoming election, demanding that it has to adhere to the highest international democratic standards.

That such Western reactions are more than boiler plate statements for the defence of democracy and human rights becomes clear due to their more than sharp language. For example, on 17th of October 2024, the European Council described the current course of the Georgian government as running «counter to the values and principles upon which the European Union is founded». Less than ten days earlier, a resolution of the European Parliament spoke even more dramatically of a «democratic backsliding free fall» of Georgia and called for sanctions against Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder, honorary chairman, and purported éminence grise of Georgian Dream «for his role in the deterioration of the political process in Georgia as well as other activities benefiting the Russian Federation». This resolution also «encourages the Government of Georgia to align fully with the EU’s foreign policy and the EU’s strategy towards Russia», explicitly calling «on the Government of Georgia to impose sanctions against Russia». European and U.S. government representatives have, on various occasions (see e.g. here and here), expressed similar views and accused the Georgian government of spreading disinformation, with 13 EU member states in an open letter to the Georgian population even speaking of «an unprecedented campaign of propaganda, (...) plain lies and defamation against its Western partners».

That said, the upcoming Georgian election is not only creating notable reactions in the West, but also in Russia, unsurprisingly with a diametrically different narrative. For example, between July and September 2024, Russia’s foreign intelligence service SVR issued three press communiqués (see here, here, and here), accusing the United States of America of interfering in the Georgian elections in order to facilitate a regime change. This is, according to the SVR and in apparent reference to Western statements like the ones cited above, set to be done through a «large-scale disinformation campaign» that blames Russia for all of Georgia’s problems and discredits Georgian Dream’s legitimate quest for political independence of the Caucasus republic. In case Georgian Dream should, in spite of this campaign, win the election, the SVR asserts that there is a U.S. plan to foment a revolution in Georgia. The latter would purportedly be created by having the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) declare the election undemocratic and the subsequent organising of mass protests through U.S.-funded NGOs. Such and similar views have also been made by other Russian officials.

Seeing the upcoming Georgian election as a geopolitically pivotal moment is also very much an internal Georgian perspective. One of the main election slogans of the ruling party Georgian Dream is «No to War — Choose Peace», which the party uses in controversial campaign advertisements that juxtaposes footage of war-torn places in Ukraine with peaceful images from Georgia that explicitly suggest that reelecting Georgian Dream secures peace and prosperity while voting for the opposition will lead to war with Russia. On the other hand, political forces opposing Georgian Dream frame the upcoming election as a fateful choice between keeping Georgia on its path to a Euro-Atlantic Western integration or the country again falling under sinister authoritarian Russian influence in case of a renewed Georgian Dream government. Such geopolitical issues are not only mentioned on the sidelines, but effectively dominate the campaign messaging of all parties competing in the upcoming elections. 

Still from a Georgian Dream election campaign advertisement juxtaposing a war-torn Ukrainian city and the slogan «No to War» with a prosperous Georgian city and «Choose Peace» (source: Georgian Dream)

The most clear and most direct geopolitical implication that the upcoming Georgian election will have is on the envisaged EU expansion. This derives from the fact that EU officials have, on various occasions, confirmed that Georgia’s EU accession process has been de facto halted and are adamant that this can only be reversed, if the present or new Georgian government changes the current course.

As such and in case Georgian Dream should secure another term, this would practically certainly mean that Georgia will not become a member of the EU in the foreseeable future, as the party shows no sign of reconsidering its policies. This holds true despite continuing assertions of current Georgian government and Georgian Dream representatives that their aimed for victory in the upcoming election will eventually allow a «reset» of relations with the EU and reopen Georgia’s path to EU membership. Many observers assess that government officials from Georgian Dream are aware that this is wishful thinking and that they only make contrary statements to mislead the public in order to not lose support. This is, given a lack of reliable information on Georgian Dream’s inner workings, speculative though and there are also indications that representatives of Georgian Dream indeed, albeit most likely wrongly, believe that the EU will eventually yield and allow Georgia to continue its accession to the EU without a change of current Georgian government policies.[3]

Assuming that such a scenario will be averted by Georgian voters delivering a resounding defeat to Georgian Dream in the upcoming election is far from as clear as the regular depiction of over 80% of Georgians being in favour of an EU accession and Georgian Dream jeopardising the latter suggests. While none of the available election polls are reliable and Georgian elections are open to surprises, it is a stark fact that even the polls with the best outlook for the opposition leave no doubt that Georgian Dream is set to remain the by far strongest party. More specifically, such polls indicate that the ruling party would, at the very least, get one third of the votes with no other party reaching 20% and even the second- and third-placed parties combined not garnering as many voters as Georgian Dream. Given that some of these polls were commissioned by opposition-friendly actors, arguing that these results were tampered with in favour of Georgian Dream can be ruled out. That said, as a government-friendly poll with the best results for Georgian Dream puts it at 59.5%, Georgian Dream again winning a majority is also a likely scenario. Potential explanations for these apparent contradictions are that many Georgians indicating in surveys that they are in favour of joining the EU might put this behind other priorities for which they are looking when voting; that they agree with Georgian Dream’s election slogan that an EU accession should only be done with «dignity», apparently meaning only as long as Georgia can preserve its current course; and/or that they fail to see that the latter is highly unlikely. 

Graffiti in Georgia’s capital Tbilisi depicting the flags of the EU and Georgia and explicitly declaring that Georgia belongs to Europe (Franz J. Marty, 14th of May 2024)

As such, even if opposition parties should get the majority of seats in the new Georgian parliament and manage to form a coalition, Georgian Dream would almost certainly still remain a force with considerable political influence, meaning that such a scenario might alleviate the current problems in Georgian-EU relations but would likely not make them vanish. This is all the more the case as the Georgian opposition is notoriously splintered, which would most likely mean that any coalition of opposition parties would remain shaky and Georgia would also in such a case be in for a rocky political future.[4]

Either way, i.e. in case of an effective end of Georgia’s EU candidacy or in case of a bumpy resumption of the accession process, this would likely not significantly affect the ongoing EU accession processes of other countries, namely Ukraine and Moldova, as they have developed independently of Georgia’s process. It could, however, in general dampen EU enthusiasm for further expansions, be it in the Caucasus (also Armenia has declared interest in an EU accession which is being explored by the EU) or elsewhere.

Beyond that, an effective end of Georgia’s EU accession process or continuing problems on this front would also almost certainly have wider implications for European and U.S. involvement in Georgia. In fact, the EU and United States of America have, due to the deplored alleged democratic backsliding, already suspended, withheld, or reallocated financial aid to the Georgian government, halted high-level meetings and, in the case of the United States of America, military exercises. From a wider geopolitical standpoint crucially, such a likely decrease in Western engagement could also negatively affect Western investment and interest in the so-called Middle Corridor, a transport route that is meant to connect China via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey or the Black Sea with Europe.

Another often heard geopolitical implication of the upcoming election are claims that Georgia would, in case of Georgian Dream securing yet another term in government, fall under heavy Russian influence. However, soberly viewed, such a scenario appears doubtful.

One of the main reasons for this is that any substantial Georgian-Russian rapprochement hinges on at least some sort of improvement of issues caused by a 5 days long war that was fought in August 2008 between Georgia on one side and Russia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, two regions that de facto broke away from Georgia, on the other and which each side claims was started by the other. In the wake of this war, Russia (and subsequently a handful of other states) recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent countries, which is opposed by Georgia and the vast majority of the international community that insist that these regions are integral parts of Georgia.

That said, vague Georgian Dream promises of a restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia in case of a win of Georgian Dream in the upcoming elections, created a flurry of rumours on this front. The arguably most prolific one was that a renewed Georgian Dream government would recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states and then form a confederation with them — something that would arguably only work with Moscow’s consent and collaboration. That such a scenario was ever seriously pursued or would have chances of success is doubtful though. In reactions to the mentioned rumours, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Russia have made it clear that their respective positions have not changed and that any progress on this front would be contingent on border delimitations and written guarantees of the non-use of force by Georgia that have been and practically certainly will remain no-gos for any Georgian government. This derives, amongst others, from the fact that, on 6th of October 2024, Georgian Dream itself explained that they had never entertained the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and/or the creation of a confederation. In view of this and given the lack of other viable short-term solutions, any swift settlement of this issue — and, thus, the notion of an imminent smooth Georgian-Russian alliance or friendship — appear more than unlikely. Conversely, there are currently also no signs that this conflict might again erupt in violence.

In general, it should also be noted that perpetuated assertions of Georgian Dream purportedly being influenced by Russia do not rest on tangible indications or evidence, but on speculative jumps to conclusions. Regularly, the reasoning seems to be that the fact that Georgian Dream leader and billionaire Ivanishvili made his fortune in Russia and that Georgian Dream talking points about the defending of traditional family values, the orthodox church, as well as a shadowy Western Global War Party resemble Russian views are a smoking gun for Russian subversion. This ignores, however, that Ivanishvili and Georgian Dream might well, and arguably more likely have their very own Georgian reasons and convictions to act like they do. 

Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder, honorary chairman and purportedly pro-Russian éminence grise of Georgian Dream (source: Georgian Dream)

Independent of the Russian angle, the upcoming Georgian election is regularly also framed as one of many battlegrounds in a general global competition between liberal democracies and illiberal authoritarian systems.

Given Georgian Dreams repeated promises to ban practically all opposition parties in case of an election victory, that the law on «Transparency of Foreign Influence» and other government actions indeed raise questions about civil liberties, and as the mentioned array of resolutions and statements of Western members of parliament and government officials often harshly depict the current Georgian Dream government as an oppressive authoritarian regime, there appears to be little doubt about who is on the side of democracy and who authoritarian. However, a closer look reveals that the situation is not as simple as it seems.

As mentioned before, all available polls and other information indicate that Georgian Dream has been and remains the political force with the by far most voter support. Accordingly, ignoring this fact or simply brushing it away by claiming that Georgian Dream’s support is only based on deceiving, buying, and/or coercing voters as is sometimes done, is, from a democratic standpoint, highly problematic.

This is especially the case as, despite the manifold problems in Georgia raised by the initially mentioned Western statements, Georgia is currently not an authoritarian state with sham elections but has a vibrant democratic environment. According to an interim report of the Election Observation Mission of the OSCE ODIHR to Georgia from 11th of October 2024, Georgia’s Central Election Commission is allowing 1,185 candidates from 27 parties to run in the upcoming elections for 150 parliament seats, with only one party — the far-right anti-Western Conservative Movement — having been barred from participating in the election on its own.[5] And while the same OSCE ODIHR report as well as manifold other sources indicate various, at times serious, concerns regarding the handling of the elections, soberly viewed this does not amount to candidates being unable or too intimidated to campaign or that there is no democratic competition possible. In this context, it is also noteworthy that fears that the Georgian Dream government would immediately use the controversial law on «Transparency of Foreign Influence» to suppress dissent have, at least so far, not materialised. Since the law came effectively into force in early September 2024, most organisations that would fall under it refuse to register as organisations pursuing the interests of a foreign power; however, as of the time of writing, the Georgian government has not fined any organisation for lack of registration and also not otherwise used the law to try to shut down political opponents or critical media.[6]

All this is not to say that the serious worries raised by Georgian stakeholders and echoed in the initially cited Western statements should be ignored or marginalised, but rather to show that the often created notion that Georgian Dream and the current Georgian government already set the stage to despotically steal the election because they would, if the election should be free, suffer a landslide loss is simply not accurate. A more sober view rather reveals that Georgian Dream does actually have considerable democratic voter support and that this is at least as much caused by the Georgian opposition at least so far apparently having been unable to win over a critical number of voters than by any potential authoritarian tilting of the democratic landscape by Georgian Dream. Ignoring or downplaying this is all the more problematic as it feeds into the above cited narratives that the West is not actually concerned about democracy, but unduly interfering in elections or even pursuing sinister plots like stoking war or facilitating coup d’états disguised as popular revolutions.

In view of all these intricacies and uncertainties, predicting what will happen in Georgia during and after the election is incredibly difficult. The only thing that seems to be certain is that any election result and any policies of the future Georgian government will be hotly contested — not only in Georgia, including in likely renewed mass protests, but also in various Western capitals as well as Moscow.

Franz J. Marty

[2] Representatives of Georgian Dream did so far not clarify who exactly this Global War Party is and only vaguely indicated that this party does not consist of Western governments or their officials, but shadowy forces indirectly influencing Western governments. 

[3] The arguably clearest example for this is a statement from the speaker of the Georgian parliament, Shalva Papuashvili, from 22nd of April 2024, in which he said that the Georgian Dream-led government had in the past been told that, if they do not release convicted and imprisoned former Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, «the EU door will be closed for Georgia» and that later similar statements had been made in case Georgia does not impose sanctions on Russia. Papuashvili then concluded that «Saakashvili is in jail, no sanctions have been imposed, and we have been given the [EU] Candidate Status», clearly indicating that he and Georgian Dream see such EU attempts to influence Georgian policy as bluffs. He also explicitly said that the EU is not «the Soviet Union, which gives directives that must be followed» but termed it a «union of equals». These comments were made as a reaction to claims that an adoption of the law on «Transparency of Foreign Influence» would derail Georgia’s way towards EU membership.

[4] Almost all opposition parties have signed the Georgian Charter, a proposal launched by the Georgian President, which foresees that, in case of an electoral win of the opposition, undersigned opposition parties shall form a technical government, immediately take various concrete steps to reopen Georgia’s EU accession process and then hold snap parliamentary elections already in 2025. However, as experience shows that promises of Georgian opposition parties to form a united front soon stumble over political bickering (for an illustrative example of the latter see here), it is very much open to question whether the Georgian Charter could be smoothly implemented.

[6] In one rather peculiar episode, the Georgian Anti-Corruption Bureau used other legislation than the cited law on «Transparency of Foreign Influence» to, on 24th of September 2024, declare two NGOs, Transparency International Georgia and Vote for Europe, as organisations with declared electoral goals which would have hindered their chosen mission to conduct independent election observations. This decision was, however, swiftly rescinded on 2nd of October 2024, after Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze had stated that the decision, albeit in his view not being wrong, was not opportune.