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Presidential Election in Sri Lanka and the Indian Ocean Chessboard

Sri Lanka’s complex geopolitical position in the Indian Ocean presents strategic vulnerabilities and opportunities. It profoundly impacts national security, foreign policy, regional geopolitical dynamics, and the island's domestic political environment. Sri Lanka’s geostrategic location in the Indian Ocean has attracted the interests of major global powers like China, India, and the US. In this backdrop, the current presidential elections on September 21 2024, with an unprecedentedly divided domestic political atmosphere, resonate with domestic and regional geopolitical consequences.


The geopolitical chessboard

In South Asia, the island sits at the crossroads of major Sea Lines of Communication in the Indian Ocean, making it indispensable for trade and naval operations. Ships from the Suez Canal or through the Strait of Hormuz must pass by Sri Lanka on their way to the Malacca Strait, and vice versa. This has sparked a rivalry between India and China as both seek to extend their influence[1]. The situation is particularly sensitive for India due to Sri Lanka’s proximity, which is vital for Indian security. New Delhi is also cautious of China’s increasing assertiveness in the Indian Ocean—a region India has historically viewed as its sphere of influence. China may downplay the formulation of the Indo-Pacific as an artificial U.S. foreign policy concept and concentrate heavily on its immediate East Asian region. Still, it remains attentive to the Indian Ocean. As tensions escalate near its borders, with China flexing its military might towards Taiwan, Beijing has consistently maintained its push to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean. Although the western region may be of somewhat lower priority than the Pacific, China is actively pursuing a two-ocean strategy that spans both the Indian and Pacific Oceans[2]. Sri Lanka also constitutes a critical strategic point in the Chinese ‘String of Pearls' strategy, which describes the Chinese attempt to build naval bases from the Strait of Malacca to the Horn of Africa, a term coined by the U.S. Department of Defence in 2004[3]

 

The U.S. considers Sri Lanka a key player in its broader Indo-Pacific strategy to counteract China’s influence. To support a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” the U.S. has ramped up diplomatic and military interactions with Sri Lanka, advocating for a more transparent and accountable governance model that aligns with U.S. values and regional stability goals[4]. Additionally, the U.S. is wary of China’s activities in the Indian Ocean. India, too, is sceptical of China’s expanding presence in the Indian Ocean, particularly with concerns about China establishing a radar base in Sri Lanka and securing a long-term lease for Hambantota Port[5]. In response, India and the US have increased their investments and defence cooperation with Sri Lanka to counter China’s growing influence. Despite Sri Lanka’s claim of maintaining a nonaligned foreign policy, its stance shifts with leadership changes. President Wickremesinghe has been critical of the AUKUS alliance and has called the Indo-Pacific framework artificial[6]. However, Sri Lanka has taken part in the US-led naval mission in the Red Sea and continues to uphold ties with Russia.

 

The Island’s role in international maritime trade and strategic competition, particularly under the influence of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has made it more susceptible to its broader power politics ambitions in the region. This situation exposes the country to external pressures and internal political instability. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy fluctuates between the influence of Western powers, particularly the United States and China, while maintaining ambiguous and balanced relations with its neighbour, India. In recent years, the country has lacked a consistent strategic approach to its foreign policy, which often shifts depending on domestic political leadership.  However, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy has frequently involved a careful balancing act between India and China, two major regional powers with conflicting interests in the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka's domestic political climate has also affected its geopolitical positioning. Frequent changes in leadership and policy have led to political instability, complicating the country’s ability to maintain a consistent foreign policy. Internal divisions frequently shape Sri Lanka’s international stance, shifting between pro-Indian, pro-Chinese, and pro-Western policies based on the current government[7].

 

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has significantly transformed Sri Lanka’s geopolitical environment. China has made substantial investments through the BRI, especially in infrastructure projects like the Hambantota Port, which sits along a key global shipping route. Although these investments have brought in crucial development funding, critics warn that they may carry the dangers of “debt trap diplomacy.” However, former permanent secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka, Palitha Kohona, says China represents 10% or less of Sri Lanka’s external debt, so attributing the country’s recent economic crisis to a debt trap is inaccurate. According to him, Sri Lanka is not trapped in debt by China[8]. Instead, the Indian Ocean nation sought assistance to address its worst economic crisis in decades, which sparked public unrest and a political crisis for the government.

 

Both geopolitical factors and domestic political and economic issues shaped Sri Lanka’s excessive borrowing. China’s substantial role as a creditor became especially problematic during the debt restructuring process after the island's economic collapse in 2022. China’s hesitant and delayed responses to restructuring further complicated Sri Lanka’s negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). China further seeks to strengthen its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and vital infrastructure projects, such as Hambantota Port and Colombo Port City, as part of the economic assistance.  As a regional power, India sought to exert its influence by offering financial aid to Sri Lanka. This assistance was provided in multiple ways, such as loans, loan postponements, credit lines, and currency swaps, particularly during the initial phase of Sri Lanka’s economic crisis. However, domestically, successive governments prioritised short-term political gains over necessary reforms, concentrating on satisfying middle-class consumption and maintaining a welfare state, even as revenues declined. 

 

International financial and economic instruments have also played a significant role in safeguarding Western interests in the island, particularly after the 2022 economic crisis. The IMF has confirmed that discussions on Sri Lanka’s IMF loan program will occur in mid-October, following the country’s upcoming presidential election. This meeting will be critical for releasing the next tranche of $350 million in funding. Meanwhile, leading opposition candidates, Sajith Premadasa and Anura Kumara Dissanayake, have indicated that they intend to renegotiate the terms of the IMF agreement if elected. Furthermore, reports from BNN Bloomberg highlight concerns over Sri Lanka’s unresolved debt restructuring negotiations with key creditors. Investors are reducing their holdings in Sri Lankan dollar bonds due to worries about potential delays in the debt resolution process.

 

Since May 2017, Sri Lanka has enjoyed improved market access to the EU under the GSP+ scheme, making it the third-largest beneficiary. Trade between the two peaked at €4.2 billion in 2022 but decreased to €3.7 billion in 2023. The EU is Sri Lanka’s second-largest trading partner, following India and ahead of China. Although the US remains the primary market for Sri Lankan exports, the EU’s role has diminished compared to India and China regarding Sri Lankan imports. In 2022, EU investment in Sri Lanka was €1 billion, and the EU has contributed around €1 billion in aid through various initiatives, focusing on supporting green economic recovery and fostering a peaceful, inclusive society. 

Presidential candidates and domestic political environment

The leading contenders in the upcoming election are current President Ranil Wickremesinghe, who has concentrated on economic stabilisation, obtaining an IMF bailout, and enforcing austerity measures. Despite some signs of economic recovery, poverty and inequality have worsened under his leadership, making him a less popular choice. Wickremesinghe’s platform supports a Theravada Trade Economy [9]. Meanwhile, Sajith Premadasa, the Leader of the Opposition, promises to tackle the economic crisis with reforms to reduce the strain on citizens. Leading the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) represents a breakaway from the traditionally right-leaning West-friendly United National Party (UNP), which has had lower-level bilateral relations with China. Premadasa’s party has been critical of Chinese investments in the past. From the leftist National People’s Power party, Anura Kumara Dissanayake advocates for economic fairness and systemic change. He has gained traction with his message of anti-corruption and systemic change. The NPP supports the IMF program but with some modifications, promoting a mixed economy and industrialisation [10].

 

The current Sri Lankan presidential elections stand out with two unique features that set them apart from previous ones. Firstly, in the south of the island, Sinhalese political parties now represent four major political divisions along the party lines, a significant departure from the two political party presidential election contests that prevailed for decades. However, according to most recent opinion polls, three presidential candidates, Ranil Wickremesinghe, Sajith Premadasa, and Kumara Dissanayake, have emerged as the first three leading candidates. Among other factors, the 2022 economic crisis is one of the primary reasons for these divides. Secondly, Tamils in the North-East have democratically endorsed a common Tamil presidential candidate with the consent of Tamil civil society actors, political activists, Tamil parliamentarians and intellectuals, advocating for their political interests that extend beyond the unitary structure of the Sri Lankan state based on the recognition of their nationhood and self-determination.

 

Key issues affecting voters include financial difficulties, national security, and social inequality, particularly in the South. Tamils in the North-East are concerned with their long-term, meaningful political solution to the decades-long ethnic conflict.  As the Southern Island's political landscape has evolved into three major political party contestations, the need for Tamil votes has grown significantly to form an alliance government with the potentially emerging candidates with narrow marginal votes. However, the people of the North and East, residing in the traditional Tamil regions, have been deeply disillusioned by the major Southern political contestants seeking their votes. This disillusionment, stemming from a painful and protracted experience of political deception and duplicity, underscores the pressing need for a fresh approach to politics. These sentiments resonate with the fact that the Sri Lankan constitution and state further entrenched the state’s theocratic and ethnocentric character as a majoritarian democracy. One of the most significant outcomes of this situation is the unprecedented decision to stage a Tamil common presidential candidate, Ariyanenthiran, beyond partisan divisions as a symbolic gesture to draw international attention to Tamil demands[11]. This initiative, championed by influential and committed Tamil civil society actors, parliamentarians, political parties, activists, and intellectuals, is a decisive step towards advocating for Tamil nationhood and self-determination. The current chairman of the prominent Tamil political party ITAK, which holds ten parliamentary seats, said, "regarding how Tamils should vote in this election, our party has always supported self-determination for the Tamil homeland[12].” ITAK, a party that played a crucial role within the Tamil National Alliance, has faced internal divisions and fragmentation. Though they initially supported the common Tamil candidate, in recent days, it has released contradicting statements because of its internal split and confusion. Another prominent Tamil political party, Tamil National People's Front (TNPF), which evolved from the political lineage of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), decided to boycott the elections, demanding a political solution beyond the unitary state structure of Sri Lanka. TNPF’s position reflected a long-standing belief that participating in the election could be interpreted as legitimising what they view as Sri Lanka’s discriminatory political system. Though they hold two parliamentary seats, has a broader reputation among the Tamil intelligentsia and the Tamil diaspora for their continued advocacy for the recognition of Tamil self-determination.

Presidential candidates and foreign powers

Because of geopolitical concerns and the powerful executive presidency system on the island, the elected leader as the country's most powerful executive president can significantly impact the island’s foreign policy. Therefore, regional and global powers are concerned with the election outcome and elected president. International players such as the EU and the U.S. and regional players such as India and China focus on the presidential election and continuously engage with the domestic political party leaders and presidential candidates to influence their decisions in the backdrop of their broader geopolitical interests in the Indian Ocean. It is one of the reasons international and regional players and domestic Sinhalese parties try to gain support from Tamil political parties who play the role of kingmakers by supporting any possible alliance that forms the government with the main Sinhalese political parties. For example, in 2015, the Tamil vote played an instrumental role in bringing Maithripala Sirisena into power. In the past, major regional and international players, particularly India and the U.S., indirectly through discreet diplomatic engagements, influenced the Tamil political parties, particularly the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), which was the largest alliance representing Tamils in the North and East to support their preferred choice of the presidential candidate. However, currently, TNA is on the decline and almost disintegrated. However, the previous two presidential elections, which the Rajapaksa won without the support of Tamil political parties, formed the government because of the overwhelming votes from the Sinhalese masses, which were based on extreme nationalistic and popular votes. Rajapaksa`s party garnered overwhelming Sinhalese popular support because of their successful defeat of the Tamil armed insurgency in 2009. His leadership sustained strong ties with China despite the serious concerns of the West and India.

 

Today, in the absence of strong nationalistic and popular Sinhalese mass support, India and other powers who have vested interests in the island are interested in how Tamil parties will behave during the elections and in the aftermath of the election in forming an alliance government if there is not an overwhelming victory of a particular candidate. Western diplomatic missions and foreign dignitaries in Colombo have already intensified their discreet and open diplomatic engagements with prominent party leaders and chosen Tamil political leaders to ensure that the upcoming presidential leadership continues to preserve their regional and domestic political and security interests.

 

India’s National Security Adviser Ajit K. Doval arrived in Colombo on August 29th to participate in the Colombo Security Conclave review deliberations. This regional initiative began as a trilateral initiative among India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives and has since expanded to include Mauritius and Bangladesh as members and the Seychelles as observers. During his visit, he met Tamil parliamentarians and reportedly stated not to “waste the votes of the Tamil people” and encouraged Tamil political parties to support a Sinhala candidate in Sri Lanka’s presidential election to negotiate with a viable candidate who could win and help realise Tamil aspirations through dialogue and talks[13]. The weakening of the Tamil political party ITAK, which aligned its policies with India's interests in the past, caused concerns for India. India is wary of any robust Tamil political initiatives or leadership emerging on the ground, which it cannot harness the power. 

 

Interestingly, as election campaigns are gaining momentum, the UN Human Rights High Commission, during the ongoing 57th Session of the Human Rights Council session, released a scathing report on Sri Lanka regarding its serious unfulfilled human rights obligations, including accountability for international war crimes, prevailing impunity, and lack of progress in democratic governance and security sector reforms [14]. The report highlights concern about the erosion of democratic processes in Sri Lanka, particularly the executive branch's influence over the judiciary and oversight institutions.

 

Ajit Doval Ranil meeting (Source: WionNews)

During the Interactive Dialogue on the report of OHCHR on the human rights situation in Sri Lanka, Indian maintained its longstanding position of requesting the full enforcement of the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution in resolving the Tamil ethnic conflict based on the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka accord, which is one of the prominent legal instrumental frameworks that promote and protect the Indian regional security and political interests in the island [15]. Similar views echoed during the Ajit Doval meeting with the Tamil Parliamentarians. At the same time, successive Sinhalese presidents in the South showed no political willingness to implement the 13th Amendment fully in a meaningful way despite current presidential candidate Sajith Premadasa’s promises to fully implement this amendment to resolve the Tamil political conflict. However, Tamils on the island feel it failed to recognise the Tamil self-determination and nationhood [16]

 

While EU, U.S., and Indian diplomats and delegations are in a flurry of diplomatic activities in Colombo, China remains cautiously observant and moves with quiet diplomacy. Chinese rapprochement with Sri Lankan South-based political parties historically concentrated on left-leaning politics, like those from the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) or its offshoots, are in power. Historically, China has tended to back centre-left governments in Sri Lanka, providing more support when leaders aligned with left-leaning politics, like those from the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) or its offshoots, are in power [17]. This trend is relevant for the 2024 election, where Anura Kumara Dissanayake, from the centre-left National People’s Power (NPP), is seen as a candidate likely to attract Chinese support. Last April, Anura Kumara Dissanayake met with Sun Haiyan, the deputy minister of the Department of International Affairs of the Chinese Communist Party, at the JVP office in Colombo, Sri Lanka.

 

Unlike the previous presidential elections, the current election involves intense domestic political and economic competition among leading candidates and broader geopolitical repercussions in the region. Several factors contribute to this trend: The severe economic crisis in 2022 on the island, the return of great power politics, and Sri Lanka’s key position in the Indo-Pacific, close to vital trade routes, which has made it a geopolitical chessboard for influence for India, the U.S. and China.  

 

Kannanathan Rajganna

Sources

[1] European Parliament Think Tank, Sri Lanka's 2024 presidential elections,

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762394 (Brussels: European Parliament, 2024).

[2]Raja, Mohan, “China Two Ocean Strategy Put India in a Pincer.” Foreign Policy, January 4, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/04/india-china-ocean-geopolitics-sri-lanka-maldives-comoros/.

[3] European Parliament Think Tank, Sri Lanka's 2024 presidential elections.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid. 

[7] Abeyagoonasekera, Asanga. Conundrum of an Island: Sri Lanka’s Geopolitical Challenges. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2021. 

[8] Zheng, Sarah. “Sri Lanka Not Caught in ‘China Debt Trap’, Says Ambassador in Beijing.” South China Morning Post, April 10, 2022. Accessed September 15, 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3173637/sri-lanka-not-caught-china-debt-trap-says-ambassador-beijing.

[9] Rajni Gamage, Kaur Kanika, Sri Lanka Election 2024: Key Political Candidates and Campaigns, last modified September 12, 2023, Institute of South Asian Studies, https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/sri-lanka-election-2024-key-political-candidates-and-campaigns/.

[10] Ibid.

[11] “Common Tamil Candidate Symbol.” Tamil Guardian. Accessed September 15, 2024. https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/common-tamil-candidate-symbol.

[12] “More Chaos in ITAK as Senior Figures Contradict Each Other Over Sri Lankan Polls,” Tamil Guardian, September 12, 2023, https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/more-chaos-itak-senior-figures-contradict-each-other-over-sri-lankan-polls

[13] “Don’t Waste Tamil Votes, India Tells Party Leaders.” The Sunday Times, September 1, 2024. https://www.sundaytimes.lk/240901/columns/dont-waste-tamil-votes-india-tells-party-leaders-570040.html.   

[14] United Nations Human Rights Council. Situation of Human Rights in Sri Lanka: Comprehensive Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. A/HRC/57/19. September 6, 2023. Accessed September 15, 2024. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/reports/ahrc5719-situation-human-rights-sri-lanka-comprehensive-report-united-nations.   

[15] Permanent Mission of India to the UN, Geneva, “Explanation of Vote after the Adoption of the Draft Resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in Sri Lanka,” September 6, 2022, https://pmindiaun.gov.in/pageinfo/MzI3Ng.

[16] Satyendra, Nadesan. “Thirteenth Amendment to Sri Lanka Constitution: Devolution or Comic Opera?” Tamil Nation, March 1988. Accessed [Insert Access Date]. URL: https://tamilnation.org.

 https://tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/tamileelam/88comicopera

[17] Kuruwita, Rathindra, 2024. “Which Candidate Is China Likely to Back in Sri Lanka’s 2024 Presidential Election?” The Diplomat, September 12, 2024. https://thediplomat.com/2024/09/which-candidate-is-china-likely-to-back-in-sri-lankas-2024-presidential-

election/.

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